Michigan Law Review
Volume 101

Issue 6

2003

Individual Vulnerability and Cultural Transformation
Eric J. Mitnick
Thomas Jefferson School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Law and Society Commons

Recommended Citation
Eric J. Mitnick, Individual Vulnerability and Cultural Transformation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1635 (2003).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol101/iss6/13

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

INDIVIDUAL VULNERABILITY AND
CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION

Eric J. Mitnick*
MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS:

CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND

By Aye/et Shachar. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni
versity Press. 2001. Pp. xiv, 193. $17.97.
WOMEN'S RIGHTS.

Perhaps the most pressing problem in multicultural theory and
practice today is the problem of individual vulnerability. Most
interested theorists and multicultural states now accept the basic
premise that some degree of state accommodation of minority cultural
practice is required as a matter of justice.' Debate then shifts to the
best justifications for, and the appropriate extent of, such group
differentiated policy. Too often lost amid these discussions is the
plight of vulnerable members of accommodated cultural groups: indi
viduals subject to repression within their cultural groups, but who lose
a critical aspect of their identities upon exit; individuals who would
retain their cultural membership, but also their rights as individuals.
It is not that the problem of individual cultural vulnerability goes
unsolved because it goes unnoticed. Rather, the problem itself
receives little prescriptive attention because most theorists who
consider the problem consider it to be insoluble.2 In her valuable new
book on multiculturalism, however, Ayelet Shachar3 takes the plight
of vulnerable cultural group members, particularly women, as her
primary focus. Further, she offers innovative legal-institutional
prescriptions designed to permit the retention and simultaneous trans
formation of cultural identities. Yet, in Multicultural Jurisdictions,
Shachar also underestimates the extent to which her legal model is
derivative of extant theory and overestimates the efficacy of her own
prescriptive design.
In the second Part of this Review, I consider Shachar's analysis of
the relationship between state accommodationist policy and intra
group repression, or what Shachar terms the "paradox of multicultural
Assistant Professor, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. AB. 1988, Cornell; J .D. 1991,
University of Michigan; M.A. (Politics) 1998, Princeton. Ed.
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Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, Introduction to CITIZENSHIP IN DIVERSE
SOCIETIES 1, 4 (Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman eds., 2000) (assessing the current state of
multiculturalism within Western democracies).
l. See

2. See infra

notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
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vulnerability" (p. 3). While there is perhaps less that is novel in
Shachar's descriptive account than one might reasonably anticipate,
the context she brings to bear on the plight of vulnerable individuals is
itself a significant virtue. In particular, Shachar's treatment of the
problem as it arises in the context of family law helpfully demonstrates
the ways that costs of multicultural accommodation may be dispropor
tionately borne by women.
In Part III, I take up Shachar's institutional prescriptions for the
transformation of illiberal cultural groups. In her conception of a joint,
but competitive, state-cultural jurisdictional scheme - a scheme
through which cultural elites would be induced, and vulnerable mem
bers empowered, to revise repressive cultural practices - Shachar of
fers an approach that is genuinely path-breaking. Yet, for all its
ingenuity, Shachar's model remains underdeveloped. The prescrip
tions Shachar offers in Multicultural Jurisdictions, at least as they now
stand, would have little effect on the lives of most at-risk group
members, including those most vulnerable to the authority of cultural
group majorities and elites.
First, though, we shall need to locate Shachar's work within (or
perhaps beyond) the broader framework of liberal-multicultural
theory. This is the subject of Part I.
I.

L I B E RAL MULTICULTURALISM

A. Culture, Community, and Justice
Like so many other ongoing discussions in modem liberal theory,
the recent multicultural debates have their roots ultimately in Rawls's
conception of justice,4 specifically in the well-known communitarian
response to that conception.5 The thrust of the communitarian
critique, relevant for present purposes, contends that Rawls's theory
relies on an overly atomistic, unrealistically universalized conception
of the self as prior to its ends. 6 The Rawlsian conception of the person,
communitarians charge, is both false, because individuals naturally
exist encumbered by particular social attachments, and ultimately
dangerous, because the radical valorization of individual right threat-

4.

See J OHN RAWLS,

A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1 971).

5. Works illustrative of the communitarian critique of Rawlsian liberalism include
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1981); MICHAEL
J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF J USTICE (1982) [hereinafter SANDEL,
LIBERALISM]; MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF J USTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY (1 983); Charles Taylor, Atomism, in 2 PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES:
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 187-211 (1.985). For an overview of these works, see Amy Gut
mann, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 308 (1985).
6. RAWLS, supra note 4, at 560 ("For the self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by
it; even a dominant end must be chosen from among numerous possibilities.").

May 2003]

Vulnerability and Transformation

1637

ens the virtues of civic and communal life.7 There was thus an obvious,
though misleading, correlation at the outset of the recent debates in
multicultural theory between proponents of cultural rights and
communitarian critics of liberalism.8 The early proponents of cultural
rights, like their communitarian counterparts, were similarly con
cerned with the affirmation of particular (i.e., cultural or communal)
attachments.9
This initial correlation between communitarianism and multicul
turalism was in part bred of a confusion over the nature of cultural
rights. Many theorists assumed that claims for cultural rights were, in
essence, assertions of group or communal rights.10 On this basis, the
multicultural debate was originally thought of as yet another front in
the broader dispute between individualists and collectivists over the
relative priority of the self and its ends. Liberal theorists thus initially
rejected multicultural claims for fear of sacrificing the precedence of
the individual to that of the community.II Even more, cultural rights
were (as it happens, correctly) perceived as claims for a formally
unequal distribution of benefits and duties among persons in society
on the basis of group membership. Liberal theorists thus initially also
opposed claims for cultural rights in defense of what they took to be
liberal neutrality.12 As a result, the first liberal proponents of multicul7. MACINTYRE, supra note 5, at 204-05; MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S
DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 14 (1996) [hereinafter
SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT] ("Unless we think of ourselves as encumbered
selves, already claimed by certain projects and commitments, we cannot make sense of . . .
indispensable aspects of our moral and political experience."); SANDEL, LIBERALISM, supra
note 5, at 152-54. In this sense, the communitarian critique echoes the earlier sentiments of
Marx. See Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 26, 42 (Rob
ert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978) (1843) ("But liberty as a right of man is not founded upon the
relations between man and man, but rather upon the separation of man from man. It is the
right of such separation. The right of the circumscribed individual, withdrawn into him
self.").
8. For an overview of the evolution of the debate over cultural rights, see WILL
KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR: NATIONALISM, MULTICULTURALISM AND
CITIZENSHIP 17-38 (2001) (hereinafter KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR] .
9. See, e.g., Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic
Minorities, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 615 (1992); Ronald G aret, Communality and Existence:
The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001 (1983); D arlene M. J ohnston, Native Rights
as Collective Rights: A Q!testion of Group Self-Preservation, 2 CAN. J.L. & J URISPRUDENCE
19 (1989); Michael McDonald, Should Communities Have Rights? Reflections on Liberal In
dividualism, 4 CAN. J.L. & J URISPRUDENCE 217 (1991); Frances Svensson, Liberal Democ
racy and Group Rights: The Legacy of Individualism and Its Impact on American Indian
Tribes, 27 POL. STUD. 421 (1979); Vernon Van Dyke, Collective Entities and Moral Rights:
Problems in Liberal-Democratic Thought, 44 J. POL. 21 (1 982).
10. See sources cited supra note 9.
11 . WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF
MINORITY RIGHTS 46 (1995) (hereinafter KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP].
12. For a recent articulation of this view, see BRIAN BARRY. CULTURE AND EQUALITY:
AN EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE OF MULTICULTURALISM (2001), contending that cultural
rights contravene liberal egalitarian principles.
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turalism faced a dual challenge: they first needed to dispel the notion
that cultural group-differentiated rights were detrimental to individual
interests; and second, they needed to· establish how it was that official
group-differentiated policies and institutions, insofar as they distin
guished among categories of persons in the distribution of benefits and
duties, were not prima facie contrary to justice. I3
Liberal multiculturalists thus set about the task of explaining that
although rights grounded in cultural differences clearly are strongly
associated with cultural group membership, this does not demonstrate
that cultural rights must be essentially equivalent to group or collec
tive rights. I4 Rather, cultural rights merely vest on the basis of cultural
membership, and most such rights (for example, language rights, rights
freely to practice one's religion) vest legally in individuals rather than
in any collective entity. Is There indeed may be cultural rights that
vest in, and can only be asserted by, a group qua group (a right to
collective self-determination, for example), but these are exceedingly
rare in modern liberal democracies.I6 Moreover, even rights that logi
cally can be pressed only by a collectivity remain grounded in individ
ual interests; rights such as these remain legitimate only to the extent
that they benefit individuals on the basis of their membership in the
particular group at issue. I7
Furthermore, the notion that modern liberal states, composed of a
plurality of ethnic, religious and (intra)national groups, could be
truly neutral with respect to culture has been exposed as fiction.18
Governments necessarily make decisions on a broad range of matters
that affect culturally identified persons in disparate ways. Public
13. See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE (1989)
[hereinafter KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE); IRIS MARION
YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990); Charles Taylor, The Politics of
Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1994).
14. See, e.g., Michael Hartney, Some Confusions Regarding Collective Rights, in THE
RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES 202-27 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995); Jan Narveson, Collec
tive Rights?, 4 CAN.J.L.& JURISPRUDENCE 329 (1991).
15. For a discussion of the investitive conditions of rights in individuals, see D.N.
MacCormick, Rights in Legislation, in LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR
OF H.L.A.HART 189, 204-05 (P.M.S.Hacker & J. Raz eds., 1977).
16. See, e.g., Avishai Margalit & Joseph Raz, National Self-Determination, 87 J. PHIL.
439 (1990). For a helpful typology of cultural rights, see Ja�ob T. Levy, Classifying Cultural
Rights, in NOMOS XXXIX: ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS 22 (Ian Shapiro & Will
Kymlicka eds., 1997).
17. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 207-09 (1986).
18. See JOSEPH CARENS, CULTURE, CITIZENSHIP AND COMMUNITY: A CONTEXTUAL
EXPLORATION OF JUSTICE AS EVENHANDEDNESS 53 (2000) ("[C)ultural neutrality is an il
lusion."); KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 1 1, at 111 (arguing that
cultural neutrality is "patently false"); KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR, supra
note 8, at 32 ("[M)ainstream institutions are not neutral, but rather are implicitly or explic
itly tilted towards the interests and identities of the majority group.").
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schooling, for example, and provision of other public services and
institutions (e.g., court systems, health and welfare agencies) must
occur in some language, and there will inevitably be members of
particular cultural groups placed at a disadvantage by such linguistic
choices.19 Similarly, decisions to close government offices on particular
public holidays - indeed the very structure of the "work week" itself
- and decisions with respect to. st�te symbols, rituals, and uniforms,
will disadvantage some persons on the basis of their culture while
granting advantages to others.20 And it would likely surprise few of us
to learn that most of these decisions tend to privilege, implicitly or
explicitly, the dominant or majority culture.21 Moreover, even self
conscious efforts to remedy cultural disadvantages by devolving
decisionmaking authority to more local levels generate certain cultural
inequities, for the decisions regarding the drawing of geographical
and jurisdictional boundaries themselves then become culturally
sensitive.22 State-sanctioned minority cultural group-differentiated
policies are thus commonly defended by multicultural theorists as a
reasonable remedy for inevitable official partiality.
B. Autonomy and Toleration
Thus, the more interesting contemporary debates in multicultural
theory rarely co'ncern the essential justice of culturally differentiated
policies per se. Rather, recent discussions tend to accept as an initial
premise that official differential treatment is made necessary by state
bias toward particular conceptions of the good, and so have focused
instead on the appropriate extent of, and occasions for, such differen
tial treatment. Indeed, with the exposure of ethnocultural neutrality as
fantasy, cultural rights have in recent years found a rather congenial
resting place directly in the heart of liberal theory.23 Yet questions re
garding just how far liberal society should go in accommodating the
19. See Charles Taylor, .Nationalism and Modernity, in THE MORALITY OF
NATIONALISM 31, 34 (Jeff McMahan & Robert McKim eds. , 1997) ("[A] state-sponsored, inculcated, and - defined language and culture, in which both economy and state function,
is obviously an immense advantage to people if this l anguage and culture are theirs.").
20. CARENS, supra note 18, at 54 (stating that public holidays and state symbols "are
always culturally laden"); KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 11, at 11415 (arguing that in countries like Canada and the United States, state symbols, public holi
days, the work-week, and government uniforms tend to "reflect the needs· of Christians").
21. KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR, supra note 8, at 24-25 (noting the tim
ing of admission of states into the union reflect choices "deliberately made to ensure that
angolophones would be a majority within each of the fifty states of the American federa
tion").
22. CARENS, supra note 18, at 54; KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra
note 11, at 112.
23. Indeed, Rawls himself has recast his theory to account for private attachments. See
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
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claims of minority cultural groups have been answered variously
depending principally upon how respondents regard the fundamental
nature of the liberal justification for differential rights. That is to say,
while debates over multiculturalism have now largely become debates
within liberal theory, they have also evolved into debates fundamen
tally about liberal theory, or about the nature and principal commit
ments of liberalism and the liberal state.24
Without doubt, the prevailing point of view in the recent multicul
tural literature has taken autonomy as the fundamental value in liberal
theory.25 The predominance of the autonomy perspective in liberal
multicultural theory is due in no small measure to its obvious associa
tion with, indeed derivation from, the classical conceptions of liberal
ism put forth by Kant, Mill, and Rawls.26 What this emphasis means
for multiculturalism is that, far from resting claims for cultural recog
nition and accommodation on communal interests (as in the first stage
of the debate described above), group-differentiated rights are now
substantially more likely to be defended as essential to individual well
being.27
And the relationship is not hard to see. Liberalism grounded in the
autonomy perspective is committed at its deepest levels to individual
self-invention;28 yet one of the principal ways in which persons define
24. Proponents of both of the broadly defined perspectives on liberalism described be
low urge a fundamental reconceptualization of liberal society as deeply plural. See Chandran
Kukathas, Cultural Toleration, in ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS 69, 84 (Ian Shapiro &
Will Kymlicka eds., 1997) [hereinafter Kukathas, Cultural Toleration ] ("[W]e should think of
the public realm as an area of convergence of different moral practices."); Joseph Raz, Mul
ticulturalism, 1 1 RATIO JURIS 1 93, 197 (1 998) ("We should learn to think of our societies as
consisting not of a majority and minorities, but as constituted by a plurality of cultural
groups. "). For an alternative view, criticizing liberalism as an authoritative basis for dis
cerning the propriety of cultural policies on the ground that liberalism is itself " embedded in
a particular culture, " see BHIKHU PAREKH, RETHINKING MULTICULTURALISM: CULTURAL
DIVERSITY AND POLITICAL THEORY 338 (2000).
25. See KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 11; JOSEPH RAZ, Multi
culturalism: A Liberal Perspective, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE
MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 1 55 (rev. ed. 1 995).
26. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (H.J.
Paton trans., HarperCollins Publishers 1 964) (1 785); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY
(Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Random House 1 974) (1859); RAWLS, supra note 4; John Rawls,
Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515 (1980).
27. See KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 1 1 , at 105 (stating that
cultural membership enables individual choice); RAZ, supra note 25, at 178 (commenting
that cultural groups' " moral claim to respect and to prosperity rests entirely on their vital
importance to the prosperity of individual human beings"). But see Chandran Kukathas, Are
There Any Cultural Rights?, 20 POL. THEORY 105, 107 (1992) [hereinafter Kukathas, Are
There Any Cultural Rights?] (observing that liberalism's " emphasis on individual rights or
individual liberty bespeaks not hostility to the interests of communities but wariness of the
power of the majority over minorities").
28. "(I]t is the privilege and proper condition of a human being . . . to use and interpret
experience in his own way . . . . He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his
plan of life for him has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. "
MILL, supra note 26, at 122-23.
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themselves is through social attachments. "For most people," as
Joseph Raz has written, "membership in their cultural group is a
major determinant of their sense of who they are; it provides a strong
focus of identification; it contributes to what we have come to call
their sense of their own identity."29 Hence, insofar as membership in a
particular cultural group may constitute an aspect of identity, rights
that respect such cultural attachments serve rather directly to protect
crucial individual interests.3° Further, in contrast to communitarian
conceptions of the self, liberal theorists envision even constitutive
ends and attachments as subject to critical reflection and revision.31
This is why official recognition and accommodation of diverse cultural
attachments is deemed essential to liberal individualism; cultural asso
ciations provide the critical "contexts of choice" within which
individuals may define and revise aspects of our selves.32 According to
the autonomy perspective, then, cultural rights are conceived of as
(some of) the instruments of liberal self-invention.
At the same time, there remain significant differences among
adherents to the prevailing autonomy perspective in liberal multicul
turalism, particularly regarding which types of groups should receive
differential treatment. For example, Will Kymlicka, who has done
perhaps more than any other theorist to frame the current debate,
29. RAZ, supra note 25, at 178; see also Bowers v. H ardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that "individuals define themselves" through freely cho
sen relationships); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984) (finding
that associational freedom " safeguards the ability independently to define one's identity that
is central to any concept of liberty").
30. To be clear, this is not to say that human identity may be constituted according
solely to any particular characteristic or affiliation; this is not, in other words, an argument
grounded in essentialism. It is instead an acknowledgement that one's culture contributes to
one's identity, and that one's identity is otherwise complex, unique, and reflective of multi
ple and cross-cutting attachments and concerns.On the compound nature of human identity,
see IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 88-89 (2000); Craig Calhoun, So
cial Theory and the Politics of Identity, in SOCIAL THEORY AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY
27-29 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1994). For discussions of the constitutive nature of group attach
ments see IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
( 1996); RAZ, supra note 25, at 178; ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING
VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. H ISTORY (1997); Robert w. Gordon, Critical Legal Histo
ries, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984); Eric J. Mitnick, Constitutive Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 185 (2000).
31. " (F)ree persons conceive of themselves as beings who can revise and alter their final
ends and who give first priority to preserving their liberty in these matters." John Rawls, Re
ply to Alexander and Musgrave, in COLLECTED PAPERS 232, 240 (Samuel Freeman ed.,
1999); see also KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP,
supra note 11, at 91 (stating that
·
conceptions of the good change "even for those people wlio think of themselves as having
constitutive ends"); John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, in
COLLECTED PAPERS, supra (positing that "our conceptions of the good may and often do
change over time, usually slowly but sometimes rather suddenly").
32. KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE, supra note 13, at 166 (1989)
(arguing that "cultural structure . . . (should be) recognized as a context of choice");
KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 11, at 82-84 (describing "societal
culture" as a critical " context of choice").
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draws a critical distinction between indigenous minority national
groups (for example, Native American and Alaskan tribes), that have
been collectively and coercively incorporated into a broader multina
tional state (like the United States), and ethnic immigrant groups,
composed of persons who have been incorporated on an individual or
familial, and to some extent volitional, basis.33 Members of incorpo
rated national groups, Kymlicka argues, arrive (though, of course, they
have never truly left) still firmly entrenched in their own "socie.tal
culture," with its distinct institutions and social practices.34 Members of
ethnic immigrant groups, on the other hand, may bring with them
certain aspects of their former lives, such as language and collective
historical narratives, but will of necessity have left behind the institu
tionalized practices that formed the core of their previous societal
cultures.35 And since Kymlicka considers access to a societal culture a
precondition of liberal justice, this distinction matters greatly. Indeed,
for Kymlicka it justifies affording more extensive cultural rights to
members of minority national groups, who require continuing access
to their own societal cultures in order to live autonomous lives, than to
members of ethnic immigrant groups, who may more readily achieve
autonomy within the societal culture of the dominant national group.36
Unsurprisingly, there is considerable disagreement among liberal
multicultural theorists of the autonomy perspective both over the
viability of the notion of a "societal culture" itself and over the propri
ety of the distinctions Kymlicka draws between different types of cul
tural groups on the basis of that construct. Joseph Carens, for exam
ple, has noted that Kymlicka's conception of access to a single societal
culture as a precondition of liberal justice, combined with his willing
ness to fold immigrants within the dominant societal culture, leads
logically to a blanket preclusion of distinctive cultural rights for ethnic
immigrants.37 Carens adheres to the basic notion of culture as an
essential context of choice for autonomous individuals, but conceives
of the sources of cultural meaning as "multiple, varying and overlap
ping," rather than as homogenous Kymlickian societal cultures.
Rather than drawing categorical lines between different types of

33. See KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 11, at 10-12.
34. Kymlicka defines " societal culture" as "a culture which provides its members with
meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educa
tional, religious, recreational and economic life, encompassing both public and private
spheres." Id. at 76.
35. Id. at 77-78.
36. Id. at 82-84.
37. CARENS, supra note 1 8, at 57.
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cultural groups, we serve justice best, Carens argues, by being more
attentive to the full context of particular cultural claims.38
Another group of liberal commentators, even more interested in
protecting cultural identities, have sought to challenge the prevailing
autonomy perspective itself. Theorists such as William Galston and
Chandran Kukathas have argued that liberalism, properly conceptu
alized, is rooted not in the notion of autonomy but in the ideals of
toleration and diversity.39 Galston and Kukathas both ground their
alternative perspectives in a vigorous libertarianism. Galston, for
example, suggests that: "The heart of the tolerance a liberal society
needs is the refusal to use state power to impose one's way of life on
others." 40 And Kukathas maintains: "For each social union to have any
significant measure of integrity, it must to some extent be impervious
to the values of the wider society." 41 Yet what is most critical in under
standing the arguments offered by these toleration theorists is
precisely that extent, or the degree to which each theorist is willing to
take their distrust of state authority in the realm of culture. For the
foundational similarity in their approaches to justifying cultural free
dom on the grounds of toleration and diversity belies an even more
fundamental difference in their conceptions of liberal society and the
political state.
For instance, although Galston at one point claims both instrumen
tal and intrinsic virtue in diversity, it seems reasonably clear that what
he is most concerned with is respecting diversity as a means toward
achieving social stability, or a fair modus vivendi.42 Kukathas, on the
other hand, defends toleration as an independent value, one constitu-

38. Id. at 72-77; see also Jeremy Waldron, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Al
ternative, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES 93 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995) (criticizing
Kymlicka's notion of a homogenous "cultural structure").
39. William A. Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, 105 ETHICS 516, 524 (1995)
("Rather than taking autonomy or critical reflection as our point of departure, what we need
instead is an account of liberalism that gives diversity its due."); Kukathas, Cultural Tolera
tion, supra note 24, at 99 (stating that "at the core of liberalism is the idea of toleration").
The recent distinction between what I have termed above the autonomy and tolerance per
spectives arose in a series of articles and responses between Kymlicka and Kukathas. See
Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights?, supra note 27, at 120; Chandran Kukathas, Cultural Rights Again: A Rejoinder to Kymlicka, 20 POL. THEORY 674, 680 (1992) [hereinafter
Kukathas, Cultural Rights Again: A Rejoinder to Kymlicka] ("The differences [between
Kymlicka and Kukathas] stem, ultimately from two views of liberalism. "); Will Kymlicka,
The Rights of Minority Cultures: Reply to Kukathas, 20 POL. THEORY 1 40 (1992).
40. Galston, supra note 39, at 524.
41. Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights?, supra note 27, at 127.
42. See Galston, supra note 39, at 527 (recognizing diversity as instrumentally and intrin
sically valuable); id. at 519 ("All too often the alternative to finding a way of living together
-a modus vivendi-is cruel and bloody strife.").

·
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tive of public reason.43 Whereas Galston remains committed . to
diversity and mutual toleration "[w]ithin a framework of civic unity,"
Kukathas would, without reservation, sacrifice social unity for tolera
tion.4 4 And where Galston continues to conceive of the liberal state as
constructed broadly for the attainment of "shared liberal purposes,"
Kukathas conceptualizes the public realm as the "convergence of
different moral practices" including, but not limited to, liberalism. 45 In
practical terms, these conceptual differences matter dramatically;
Kukathas's cultural libertarianism becomes far more radical than
Galston's. For example, while Galston's conception of liberalism as
toleration would nonetheless urge a "vigorous" liberal civic education
and "strong prohibitions . . . against the use of coercion to prevent
individuals from leaving . . . [cultural] groups," Kukathas's would
sustain "communities which bring up children unschooled and illiter
ate" and exclude intervention "[e]ven in cases where there is clear
evidence of terrible practices."4 6 Hence, the toleration perspective on
liberalism exhibits a certain degree of diversity of its own.
C. A New Path?
Recent liberal-multicultural theory has thus been marked by two
major stances: the autonomy and toleration perspectives on liberalism.
Moreover, there has been a significant range of disagreement between
the two as well as within each perspective. Yet on one issue, the views
of all of the above commentators converge. Theorists of the autonomy
and toleration perspectives commonly presume an inevitable clash
between the collective interests of any given cultural group and the
individual interests of certain of its members.
Adherents of both the autonomy and toleration perspectives
generally countenance what Kymlicka has called "external protec
tions," or group-differentiated policies designed to "protect a pc;trticu
lar ethnic or national group from the destabilizing impact of the deci
sions of the larger society." 47 These sorts of protections - for
example, conduct exemptions granted to members of· particular
religious groups, or rights to the use of particular languages or natural
resources - seek to achieve a fair degree of equality between different
groups in society. Where the perspectives differ, however, is with
43. Kukathas, Cultural Toleration, supra note 24, at 83 ("Toleration is not important
because it promotes reason . . .. [T]oleration is important because if toleration is forsaken
then so is reason. ").
44. Galston, supra note 39, at 526; Kukathas, Cultural Toleration, supra note 24, at 99.
45. Galston, supra note 39, at 525; Kukathas, Cultural Toleration, supra note 24, at 84.
46. Galston, supra note 39, at 528; Kukathas, Cultural Toleration, supra note 24, at 87,
89.
47. KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 11, at 37.
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respect to what Kymlicka terms "internal restrictions," or cultural
group claims "to restrict the liberty of [group] members in the name of
group solidarity."48 These sorts of claims, ranging from constraints on
criticism of group customs to practices involving mutilation and
arguably torture, seek collective freedom to preserve and implement
traditional practices, even at the expense of individual freedom and
equality within particular groups.49
With respect to claims for internal restrictions, theorists who take
autonomy as liberalism's fundamental commitment would privilege
individual over collective freedom, whereas theorists who conceive of
liberalism's core as toleration would more readily sacrifice intragroup
individual liberty to cultural tradition. Indeed, this point of diver
gence, as described here by Kukathas, serves as the essential presup
position of the current liberal-multicultural debate:
My contention here is that we are faced with a fundamental conflict
between two irreconcilable aspirations: on one hand, to leave cultural
communities alone to manage their own affairs, whatever we may think
of their values; and, on the other hand, to champion the claims or the in
terests of individuals who, we think, are disadvantaged by their commu
nities' lack of regard for certain values. Unfortunately, one cannot have
0
it both ways.5

In Multicultural Jurisdictions, however, Shachar aims to disprove
this presupposition. She maintains that we can indeed have it both
ways. To do so, however, Shachar argues that we need "a new way of
practicing multiculturalism" (p. 5), one that will "align the benefits of
enhanced external protections between groups with the benefits of re
duced internal restrictions" (p. 8). We need a "brave new blueprint"
(p. 7) that will enable us to "strive[] for the reduction of injustice
between groups, together with the enhancement of justice within
them" (p. 4). We need "a new and better way of accommodating
difference" (p. xi), "[t]ruly new thinking on multiculturalism" (p. 15),
"new and better legal-institutional mechanisms" (p. 62), "a new
architecture for dividing and sharing authority in the multicultural
state" (p. 13), even "a radically new architecture for dividing and
sharing authority in the multicultural state" (p. 88; emphasis added).
Shachar is clearly correct that a new approach is needed. The
problem is that too much of what Shachar offers here is not new, and
the portion that is genuinely innovative, at least as it stands, will not
work. But Multicultural Jurisdictions represents an important institu
tional turn in the multicultural debate, an opening that theorists
should seize upon and further develop. Indeed, as I shall demonstrate
48. Id. at 36.
49. See Amy Gutmann, The Challenge of Multiculturalism in Political Ethics, 22 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 171, 195 (1993) (noting that "clitoridectomy may qualify as a form of torture").
50. Kukathas, Cultural Rights Again: A Rejoinder to Kymlicka, supra note 39, at 678.
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below, while Shachar's descriptive project here too often recycles
prior discussions, her institutional prescriptions are likely to frame the
debate for years to come.
II.

CULTURAL G ROUPS AND INDIVIDUAL VULNERABILITY

A. The Paradox ofMulticultural Vulnerability
Shachar's descriptive project begins with twin admonitions,
familiar to the multicultural literature, regarding the nature of per
sonal identity and the structure of society. First, Shachar cautions, we
must "re-acquaint ourselves with the complex and multi-layered
nature of multicultural identity" (p. 15). This is the now proverbial
reminder to avoid overessentializing the cultural aspect of group
members' identities. The idea, which virtually all theorists appear to
have accepted, is that no individual may be constituted according
solely to any particular aspect of their identity; rather, all persons exist
as complex psychic entities, with multiple, crosscutting and even
contradictory attachments and concerns.51 Second, and relatedly,
Shachar reminds her readers that modern society is structured
according to the "multicultural triad" of group, state, and individual,
and that the individual will "have interests and rights that derive from
concurrent membership in both group and state" (p. 5).
As we have seen above, and as Shachar reminds us here, the multi
dimensional nature of human identity and modern society serve in
most accounts of liberal multiculturalism as critical elements in the
justification of official group-differentiated policies and institutions.52
Yet Shachar emphasizes these aspects not to buttress further the
interests of cultural groups, but rather to focus attention on the inter
ests of the individuals within such groups (p. 6). Her point is that while
state accommodation of cultural difference may be required as a
matter of justice, we must at the same time not lose sight of our critical
concern for the general rights and life opportunities of the individual
members of cultural groups once the group has been accommodated.
"In an ideal world," writes Shachar, "enhancing the autonomy of
nomoi groups would also always improve the status of at risk individu
als inside the group, or at least would never serve to legitimate the
maltreatment of certain group members."53 In reality, however, certain
51. See YOUNG, supra note 30, at 88-89; Calhoun, supra note 30, at 27-29; Mitnick, supra
note 30, at 200. Anthony Appiah has noted the existence of both collective and personal di
mensions of individual identity. See K. Anthony Appiah, Identity, Authenticity, Survival:
M11/tic11/t11ra/ Societies and Social Reproduction, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE
POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 149, 151 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994).
52. See supra Section J.B.
53. Pp. 4-5. Shachar's reference to cultural groups as "nomoi groups" is derived from
Robert Cover's use of the Greek nomos to describe a discrete legal culture, or a collection of
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traditional practices for which cultural groups will seek accommoda
tion will directly contravene the individual rights of particular group
members, even to the point of being radically repressive. Even more,
the state will then be complicit in the cultural repression of vulnerable
group members, for the vulnerability of particular categories of
persons, and in particular women, is often already deeply encoded in
cultural nomoi. State accommodation thus serves at times to perpetu
ate already existing power hierarchies and, with them, intragroup
repression (p. 47). "[H]ow" then, Shachar asks, "do we protect group
members from routine violations of their citizenship rights, when
those violations arise from the traditional practices of the group
which we have already sanctioned through accommodation?" (p. 3).
This is the dilemma that Shachar terms "the paradox of multicultural
vulnerability" (p. 3).
Now, the reality of threats to individual members of cultural
groups from state accommodation of traditional practices has been
discussed at length by numerous theorists.54 Yet even if her identifica
tion of this multicultural dilemma is itself less than novel, one signifi
cant virtue of Shachar's treatment is the context she brings to bear on
the problem. As Joseph Carens has indicated, and as Shachar here
echoes (p. 8), "we do not really understand what general principles
and theoretical formulations mean until we see them interpreted and
applied in a variety of specific contexts."55 Reflecting this concern,
Shachar introduces several genuinely valuable examples of multicul
tural experience throughout her book. And she does so not simply
from well-recognized modern pluralistic states like the United States
(pp. 18-20) and Canada (pp. 152-54), but also from countries as seem
ingly diverse as India (pp. 80-84), Kenya (p. 55, n.43), and Israel (pp.
79-80). Indeed, Shachar's description of the paradox as it arises in the
arena of family law (ch. 3) is perhaps the most sustained contextual
analysis of the problem of individual cultural vulnerability to date.
Shachar describes family law as the "specific social arena where
the multiculturalism paradox often hits hardest" (p. 11). Indeed, even
absent multicultural accommodation, there is perhaps no communal
realm more commonly conceptualized as private than that of the
family, and collective privacy has been shown to breed individual
persons joined in virtue of a particular set of group-generated prescriptions and unique nar
ratives. P. 2; see also Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term - Foreword: Nomos
and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).

54. See, e.g., KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 11, at 38 (noting
that some cultural groups "are concerned with controlling internal dissent, and seek group
differentiated rights in order to impose internal restrictions on their members"); Kukathas,
Cultural Toleration, supra note 24. at 88 ("[S]ignificant harms can be inflicted (by the domi
nant powers in the group) on the most vulnerable members of a minority community. "); Su
san Moller Okin, Feminism and Multiculturalism: Some Tensions, 108 ETHICS 661 (1998).
55. CARENS, supra note 18, at 3.
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vulnerability.56 Yet, as Shachar points out, such vulnerability becomes
even more acute as authority over the regulation of family life is
devolved from the state, which is somewhat more likely to intervene
to protect at-risk individuals, to the leaders of the family's cultural
group, the traditional precepts of which may explicitly prescribe indi
vidual vulnerability (p. 45). Moreover, since so many cultural groups
define the contours of their communities according to familial lineage
and marital-status rules (p. 52), group leaders are more likely to
demand jurisdiction in the context of family law than in virtually any
other legal arena (p. 57). "A nomoi group's membership rules,
encoded in family law, thus provide the bonds which connect the past
to the future, by identifying who is considered part of the tradition"
(p. 46). Indeed, in the absence of authority over the rules, and there
fore bounds, of group membership, a cultural community's capacity
to preserve and further construct its unique collective identity must
to some extent be sacrificed. And this will be particularly true of
nonterritorial cultural groups, or "imagined communities" (p. 54), the
membership boundaries of which can only be constructed socially.
The collective constitutive autonomy enjoyed by virtue of state
accommodation of cultural traditions is not without its costs, and
Shachar's thorough exploration of the relationship between multicul
tural accommodation and family law demonstrates the ways in which
the costs of accommodation and collective autonomy are often borne
disproportionately by the more vulnerable members of minority
cultural groups, particularly women. "[W]omen occupy a special
position in constituting collective identities" (p. 50), since they are
"the bearers of legitimate children and [the] primary socializers of the
young" (p. 55). Yet, ironically, the unique biological and social roles
women occupy in the preservation and extension of cultural identities
serve also to rationalize severe limitations on their life options (p. 56).
For example, since many cultural groups view control over marriage
and birth as critical elements in the demarcation of membership in
their communities, such groups may seek to prescribe "how, when,
and with whom women can give birth" (p. 52). Further, women may
be denied educational and employment opportunities, and, in the
event of divorce, inequitable property distribution rules may be
applied, in an effort specifically to prevent women from abandoning
their roles as bearers of the group's nomos (p. 56).
Faced, at once, with seemingly imperative collective claims to
cultural constitutive autonomy and self-determination, but also the
knowledge that accommodation of such claims is likely only to
perpetuate the vulnerability of particular categories of individuals
within cultural groups, what resolution from the perspective of liberal

56. See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 134-69 (1989).
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justice? How are we to respond to the paradox of multicultural
vulnerability? In the central portion of her book, Shachar describes
the currently prevailing responses to the paradox, each of which she
characterizes as inadequate, and she then presents her own solution,
centered on an innovative legal-institutional model. Yet, in the
process, Shachar too readily discounts the extent to which her institu
tional approach is derivative of, and indeed supported by, liberal
multicultural theory.
B.

Responses to Multicultural Vulnerability

Shachar discusses two primary theoretical responses, both of which
serve as a source for a dominant legal approach, to the problem of
multicultural vulnerability. The "re-universalized citizenship" re
sponse (pp. 65-68), exhibited in the writings of persons such as Susan
Moller Okin and Brian Barry,57 maintains that where the good of a
particular individual and that of her cultural group conflict, the state
must privilege the interests of the individual, even if the result is a
radical severance of the individual from her. culture. Derivative of this
first theoretical response, the "secular absolutist" legal model (pp. 7278) declines to accommodate the traditional practices of cultural
groups, electing instead to preserve full state authority over, and so
protection of, group members. In contrast, the "unavoidable costs"
theoretical response (pp. 68-70), advocated most prominently by
Chandran Kukathas,58 contends that the multicultural state must be
severely constrained from intervening between a cultural group and its
members, even given pervasive individual-rights violations. This
second response, then, provides the underlying theoretical basis for
the "religious particularist" legal model (pp. 78-85), which (predicta
bly) grants far more extensive authority to cultural groups to pursue
traditional beliefs and practices.
Now, of course, these positions are essentially relabeled reitera
tions of, on the one hand, premulticultural-universalistic liberalism,
and, on the other, the toleration perspective on liberal multicultural
ism.59 Nevertheless, Shachar's insightful criticism of certain aspects of
the leading proponents' theories is worthy of attention. For example,
Shachar seems clearly right in suggesting that Okin's sweeping view
that multiculturalism necessarily degrades women fails to account for
potential female agency, and so too radically discounts the prospect of
57. P. 64; see BARRY, supra note 12; Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for
Women?, 22 BOSTON REV. 25 (1997).
58. P. 65; see Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights?, supra note 27; Kukathas, Cul
tural Toleration, supra note 24.
59. See supra Sections I.A-B Shachar's own theory, I contend below, is a working out of
the autonomy perspective.
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cultural change in virtue of that agency (p. 66). Similarly, Shachar
demonstrates that Kukathas's position rests on some arguably dubious
assumptions: first, while he relies heavily on individual freedom of
association to justify multicultural accommodation, most cultural
group members join at birth rather than as a result of any explicit con
sensual act; and second, while cultural membership may as a matter of
justice entail recognition and accommodation, so too might member
ship in other social identity (for example, gender) groups (p. 70).
Though she does not mention it in connection with her analysis of
these two radically divergent theoretical responses, Shachar is also
critical of a third, more moderate, response to the problem of multi
cultural vulnerability. This third theoretical response - labeled at one
point by Shachar as "weak multiculturalism" (p. 29) - is in fact none
other than the autonomy perspective on liberal multiculturalism,
described above, and conveyed most prominently by Will Kymlicka.60
Yet, Shachar's critique of Kymlicka's theoretical approach is strange
indeed, for Shachar's own prescriptive legal model appears to be
grounded in Kymlicka's liberal-multicultural theory..
Recall that Kymlicka's theory of multicultural accommodation
calls for equality between cultural groups, in the form of "external
protections," but rejects claims pressed by cultural groups that would
violate individual members' general rights, on the ground that such
"internal restrictions" are inconsistent with liberal autonomy.61 In
Multicultural Jurisdictions, Shachar contests Kymlicka's "too simple
distinction between 'external' and 'internal' aspects of accommoda
tion" (p. 42) on two grounds. First, Shachar challenges the "viability"
of the distinction itself, arguing that the powers afforded to cultural
groups in the name of external protections might also be used by the
group to impose internal restrictions (p. 30). Second, Shachar claims
that Kymlicka's approach, grounded as it is in liberal autonomy, is
self-defeating, insofar as it advocates the extension of external protec
tions notwithstanding potential restrictions on individual freedom.62
But Shachar's critique of Kymlicka is misleading on both counts.
Kymlicka's theory clearly does account for the possibility that "exter
nal protections can open the door to internal restrictions."63 More
60. See supra Section I.B.
61. KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 11, at 35-44
62. Kymlicka's model, Shachar says, "contradicts its own central tenet when it advocates
accommodation even in cases where putting legal authority in the hands of the identity
group means exposing certain group members to routine in-group violations of their individ
ual citizenship rights. " P. 29.
63. KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 11, at 43; see also id. at 40
("(P]olyethnic rights [might] be used to impose internal restrictions. "); id. at 42 ("This dis
tinction between internal restrictions and external protections .. . is not always easy to draw.
Measures designed to provide external protections often have implications for the liberty of
members within the community. "); id. at 44, 153 (stating that internal restrictions "are incon-
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importantly, Kymlicka is manifestly hostile to the prospect of accom
modative policy serving as cover for intragroup-rights violations.64
Yet, while Shachar fails to demonstrate that Kymlicka's theory is
misguided, she does reveal a sense in which his approach is incom
plete. For while Kymlicka is clearly sensitive to the relationship be
tween external protections and internal restrictions, he has not, to
date, offered a means to detach cultural accommodation from intra
group repression. Indeed, the most sensible reading of Shachar's
approach may be as an institutional working out of Kymlicka's
autonomy perspective on multicultural accommodation. Both
Shachar's concern for the vulnerability of particular categories of indi
viduals, and her insight that state protection of cultural groups might
exacerbate unjust restrictions on the liberty of individual members,
are already manifest in Kymlicka's work. Hence, despite Shachar's
efforts to distance and distinguish herself from Kymlicka, it seems as if
Kymlicka supplies the theoretical response to the problem of multicul
tural vulnerability that underlies Shachar's own innovative legal
model.
III.

TRANSFORMATIVE MULTICULTURALISM

A. Four Models ofJoint Governance
Shachar critiques what she characterizes as the two dominant
responses to multicultural vulnerability for imposing upon cultural
group members an unfortunate and unnecessary ultimatum. Under
either approach, it's "either your culture or your rights" (p. 5):
Both approaches offer a misguided 'either/or' resolution to the paradox
of multicultural vulnerability. Both require that women and other poten
tially at-risk group members make a choice between their rights as citi
zens or their group identities. But this amounts to a choice of penal
ties . . . .

Neither

the

're-universalized

citizenship'

option

nor

the

'unavoidable costs' approach has satisfactory answers to offer women
and other members who legitimately wish to preserve both their cultural
identities

and to

challenge the power relations encoded within their mi

nority groups' traditions. (p. 71)

sistent with any system of minority rights that appeals to individual freedom or personal
autonomy ").

64. Indeed, in an interesting exchange with Shachar, Kymlicka makes this point clear:
It's clear that the capacity to impose internal restrictions is inextricably bound up with the
acquisition of external protections, and so we need to analyse them together. However, my
claim is that the goal, from a liberal point of view, is (a) to ensure that groups have the ex
ternal protections they need, while (b) creating the institutional safeguards which prevent
groups from imposing internal restrictions.

Will Kymlicka, Comments on Shachar and Spinner-Halev: An Update from the M11/ticultur
alism Wars, in MULTICULTURAL QUESTIONS 1 12, 127 n.7 (Christian Joppke & Steven Lukes
eds., 1999).
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In order, then, to transcend an ultimately insufferable choice
between one's culture and one's freedom from cultural oppression and so to permit vulnerable individuals to continue to find meaning in
their group memberships while simultaneously maintaining access to
their general rights - Shachar suggests we must take an institutionalist
turn. We must reexamine our assumptions with respect to jurisdiction
itself, or the legal-institutional doctrine delineating public decisional
authority (p. 72). Contrary to the preconceptions underlying the cur
rently dominant legal and theoretical paradigms, it is not the case, says
Shachar, that cultural group members must be subject solely to one
source of legitimate authority, either the state or the group (p. 85).
Indeed, "in today's day and age, no single authority can expect to be
the sole source of legal norms and institutions affecting its members"
(p. 15). Instead, Shachar contends, the only practicable solution to
the paradox of multicultural vulnerability lies in a scheme of joint
governance.
A joint governance approach is grounded in what Shachar terms a
" 'cultural' understanding of institutions" (p. 89). The approach recog
nizes that individuals may concurrently belong to, and so derive rights
and obligations from, multiple communities (p. 13). It thus seeks a
solution to the complicated problem of multicultural accommodation
and individual vulnerability by engendering interaction, and at times
even open competition, between different sources of jurisdiction (p.
88). Before rendering her own preferred joint governance structure,
Shachar describes and assesses four already existing legal-institutional
models that exhibit features of joint governance. The critical
commonality among the four designs considered is in the idea that
each may provide a means to escape the intolerable either/or dichot
omy imposed by the more extreme universalist and particularist
approaches described above. Under a joint governance institutional
model, the expectation is that one may have one's rights and one's
culture too.
The first, and to those familiar with American governmental struc
tures, most recognizable, form of joint governance is a "federal-style
accommodation" approach, under which legal authority is allocated
across different levels of government (p. 92). This devolution of juris
dictional authority to more local agencies may provide an enhanced
degree of collective autonomy to nomoi groups with substantial
populations in a given region, while simultaneously constraining
repressive group practices by virtue of generally applicable individual
rights. Yet the very aspect of federalism that potentially yields more
expansive cultural freedom, Shachar points out, serves also to limit the
structure's efficacy more generally: the accommodationist resources of
federalism are limited to territorially based groups (pp. 94-95).
The second joint governance scheme, which Shachar describes as
"temporal accommodation," divides authority over individual group
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members between the state and the cultural group according to certain
time intervals linked to those traditions conceived of as most critical to
the preservation of the group's nomos (p. 97). Shachar in fact suggests
that the well-known case Wisconsin v. Yoder65 might be viewed as an
illustration of temporal accommodation, insofar as the Amish children
involved in the case fell within the jurisdiction of state educational
authorities until eighth grade, but within the jurisdiction of the cultural
group beyond that point (p. 98). Yet, as above, the same aspect of
temporal accommodation that serves to maintain the group nomos
also condemns the scheme; for during the period of time that members
remain subject to the jurisdictional authority of the group, individuals
necessarily also remain vulnerable to culturally enacted repression (p.
103).
The third form of joint governance, termed "consensual accom
modation," allocates a one-time choice among jurisdictional frame
works to each individual (p. 103). So, for example, a member of a par
ticular religious group might decide to marry in accordance with her
group's traditions, or she may instead opt for a state-sanctioned
ceremony. The authority selected would then also have jurisdiction
over the dissolution of that relationship. A virtue of the consensual
accommodation model, then, is its aspiration to promote individual
agency in the affirmation of cultural attachments. Yet, as with other
consent-derivative structures, the consensual approach presupposes
that choice is truly free - at best an arguable supposition in the realm
of cultural membership, and doubly so with respect to vulnerable
group members. Moreover, the conclusive nature of the choice,
Shachar observes, fails to protect individual members from the un
foreseeable consequences of their jurisdictional decisions. While "(i]t
might seem like a merely symbolic and natural decision at the time, to
preserve the traditions of one's forebears by celebrating marriage in
accordance with the group's practices" (p. 108), the constraints
imposed by one's culture on divorce or childrearing might be far less
bearable. Indeed, the one-time character of the jurisdictional decision
merely resurrects, rather than remedies, the either/or culture/rights
conundrum.
The final model considered by Shachar, prior to her own, is the
"contingent accommodation" model. Here jurisdictional autonomy is
devolved from the state to nomoi groups in particular legal contexts
deemed essential to the group's cultural identity, but only so long as
the group's implementation of its authority rises above state-defined
minimum standards (p. 109). The most immediate problem with this
approach, Shachar suggests, is the almost certain perpetuation of
cultural partiality, in light of the state's singular role in delineating

65. 406 U.S.205 (1972).
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standards. Ian Shapiro, among other theorists, has sought to redress
such bias, while still averting cultural repression, through the creation
of multidimensional regulatory structures.66 Under such an approach,
matters would be divided as subject either to state or cultural primary
jurisdiction, but with the alternate authority serving in a "back-up"
role as a source of secondary jurisdiction (p. 111 ). Thus, the cultural
entity might exercise primary authority within a context critical to its
nomos, and the state would retain primary jurisdiction within contexts
more generally critical to human well-being, but in each case a secon
dary authority would strive to ensure the legitimacy of the decision
reached.
Despite the promise she sees in this sort of dynamic interactive
approach to joint governance, Shachar questions the contingent
model's practicability: For example, would state or cultural norms
determine error? While the state might surely intervene in cultural
affairs, by what mechanism could the cultural group intervene in state
affairs? Moreover, by leaving the division of primary authority to state
and cultural auspices, the virtue of individual agency raised by the
consensual model is sacrificed. Individual members are thus "forced to
play the role of whistleblowers (informing the other jurisdictional
authority of violations of their rights by the other entity), instead of
being allowed to work as authors" of the institutional structure
designed to protect their own interests (p. 113; emphasis added).
Hence, all four extant models of joint governance present institu
tional structures designed, in recognition of persons' multiple attach
ments, to compel interaction between state and cultural sources of
authority. While each approach presents certain virtues, each also, in
its own way, fails ultimately to accommodate cultural differences while
simultaneously protecting vulnerable group members from cultural
repression. In what then lies the solution to the paradox of multicul
tural vulnerability? The fatal flaw, Shachar believes, common to each
institutional design so far considered, lies in the failure of each
approach to hinge the accommodation of traditional group practices
on the reduction of intragroup repression (pp. 89, 1 13). To do so, says
Shachar, we need an institutional structure of joint governance specifi
cally designed to induce cultural elites, and to empower vulnerable
individuals, to transform their cultures from within (p. 14).
B.

Cultural Transformation

As with the four institutional schemes described above, indeed
incorporating certain of their more salutary aspects, Shachar's "trans
formative accommodation" model embraces the notion of multiple

66.

See

IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE (1999).
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sources of authority linked to persons' "multiple identity-creating
affiliations" (p. 118). What distinguishes transformative accommoda
tion from previously considered joint governance models, according to
Shachar, is three core principles.
First, the transformative model would divide jurisdiction between
the state and cultural groups not merely along traditional subject
matter lines (for example, education, family law, criminal justice), but
also within each social context. Thus, neither the state nor the group
would maintain exclusive jurisdiction with respect to, say, marriage;
instead, the cultural group might retain power over issues of status and
membership, while the state might exercise authority over the distri
bution of property (pp. 119-20). The point of this first condition, which
Shachar terms "the 'sub-matter' allocation of authority" (p. 1 18),
is both to permit concurrent state and cultural influence over
group members and to compel interaction among those sources of
authority.67
Shachar's second principle she calls "the 'no monopoly' rule" (p.
1 18). "According to this rule, neither the group nor the state can ever
acquire exclusive control over a contested social arena that affects
individuals both as group members and as citizens" (p. 121). But this
requirement seems an effective corollary of the first; allocating juris
diction within contested social contexts according to "sub-matters,"
and mandating that no single authority maintain monopoly power
over any contested social context, seem but two sides of the same
coin.68
Shachar's third principle, "the establishment of clearly delineated
choice options" (p. 1 18), does a bit more work. With this condition,
Shachar's model offers members of cultural groups a wholly new
option, and a new instrument for change: it offers at-risk individuals a
partial exit. Individual members, Shachar proposes, "must have clear
options which allow them to choose between the jurisdiction of the
state and the nomoi group. Choice here means that they can remain
within the submatter jurisdiction of the original power-holder
(approval) or that they can resist that jurisdictional authority at
predefined 'reversal' points (disapproval)" (p. 122). According to
Shachar's theory, the opportunity to invoke a partial exit would enable
vulnerable individuals to exercise their rights as citizens of the state
67. "Meaningful consideration of marriage and divorce rules thus requires a considera
tion of both jurisdictions: the authority which governs each distinct legal sub-matter, as well
as the complementary authority which jointly governs (or 'co-prevails') in a contested social
arena. " P. 120.
68. Shachar notes the inevitable inefficiencies that would be associated with a joint gov
ernance model, like hers, that requires interaction across jurisdictions to resolve fully any
dispute. She contends that on balance any loss in judicial economy is more than compen
sated for by the gain registered from a critical review of cultural traditions and (somewhat
vaguely) of federalist-institutional structures more generally. Pp. 130-31.
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without sacrificing their cultural identity. Even more, by affording
individuals the option to choose between cultural and state sources of
authority, this model would engender competition between jurisdic
tions, and, with it, the capacity for cultural transformation (p. 123).
One example, indeed one that recurs in Shachar's treatment (pp.
57-60, 133-35), is the traditional Jewish notion of an "anchored
woman," or an agunah. Under Jewish law, a married woman cannot
initiate a religious divorce (a get), and so become free to remarry
within her faith, without first obtaining her husband's consent.69 The
consequences of the doctrine are frequently quite severe; a recalci
trant or abusive husband might engage in blackmail, leaving an
agunah with no choice beyond ceding undeserved (typically, property
or custodial) rights to her husband or abandoning her cultural
membership (pp. 58-59). Consider, though, how the situation might
change under an accommodation model that empowers vulnerable
individuals by offering them clearly delineated choice options. The
agunah seeking a divorce would be afforded an opportunity partially
to exit; that is, to sever her current relationship pursuant to state juris
diction. She would then be free (by force, if necessary) to remarry in
accordance with her cultural traditions.70 Hence, partial exit may
enable a vulnerable member of a cultural group to exercise her
general rights as a citizen of a liberal state, yet also retain her particu
lar cultural identity.
Shachar's most critical point here, though, is not merely that
partial exits should be made available, but that where partial exits are
made available, they will rarely be needed. Faced with the prospect of
selective exit, indeed faced with exit by the biological and social
"bearers" of the group's nomos,71 cultural leaders will have a strong
incentive to reinterpret their texts and traditions in ways that enable
them to reverse oppressive and discriminatory practices.72 "Avoiding
the reversal of jurisdiction becomes a matter of self-interest to the
group, since it allows the group to protect whatever degree of self
regulating power it has already secured over its members, rather than
risk losing it piecemeal" (p. 125). The partial exit is thus not an end in
itself, but an instrument of cultural change. It is a risk imposed upon
cultural elites, the avoidance of which entails the avoidance of cultural
repression. Moreover, by devolving jurisdictional decisions to indi69. Pp. 57-58. For the biblical source of this doctrine, see Deuteronomy 24:1.
70. "At this point, the state will acquire (group-backed) authority to enforce the re
moval of all barriers to remarriage (even if the marriage was originally created by religious
solemnization)." P. 135.
71.

See supra

Section II.A.

72. "Nomoi communities are living entities. They are not suicidal in nature. Most have
ample resources for re-interpretations which permit them to preserve their nomos while
adaptively responding to change. " P. 140.
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victuals themselves, the transformative model creates "a dynamic new
space for meaningful participatory group membership" (p. 123). The
transformation of culture is thus accomplished not merely from on
high, but broadly in virtue of the actions and expectations of all group
members, including those individuals historically more vulnerable. In
that sense, Shachar's design seemingly aspires to democratize culture.
One obvious criticism sure to be leveled against Shachar by the
proponents of a more accommodating approach to cultural practice
(for example, the toleration perspective), would consist in the notion
that any state-imposed cultural change, regardless of the particular
agents of that change, necessarily fails to treat cultural groups justly.73
A culture transformed from within, but only in virtue of a structural
remedy imposed from without, is no different, according to this "non
interventionist" view, than a culture transformed directly by the state
(p. 37). Shachar has a response to this view, however. She asserts that
cultural practice, at least in modern multicultural states, is critically
enmeshed within a broader social context: "[T]he group and the state
are both viable and mutable social entities which are constantly af
fecting each other through their ongoing interactions" (p. 1 18).
Indeed, Shachar suggests that it may in fact be interaction with an
overly accommodationist state that unnaturally arrests the otherwise
"organic processes of [cultural] change" (p. 85). In response to a state
which affords expansive jurisdiction to groups on the basis of cultural
difference, cultural elites have incentives to maintain such differences
in order to maintain their authority, even where the maintenance of
difference entails the maintenance of oppressive practices.74 Hence,
Shachar notes an important, if rather ironic, sense in which transfor
mative accommodation might actually enable, rather than subvert, the
normal processes of collective cultural self-determination. Of course,
in light of the uniformly antirepressive ends she expects her model to
provoke, to accept Shachar's premise (that state-imposed cultural
transformation merely frees the culture to evolve as it naturally
would) one would also have to believe that cultures naturally evolve in
a linear, and uniquely progressive, fashion.
Yet even placing alternative perspectives to one side, Shachar's
model is problematic on its own terms because it is radically underde
veloped. Recall that, as articulated by Shachar, transformative
accommodation is premised on three (really just two)75 principles: (1)
the "sub-matter allocation of authority"; (2) the "no monopoly rule";
and (3) "the establishment of clearly delineated choice options" (p.
73. Shachar notes that, in this sense, her transformative model might be perceived "as
indirect intervention into the group's 'private' affairs, a multicultural state acting ultra vires."
P. 1 26 n.20.
74. Shachar terms this phenomenon "reactive culturalism." Pp. 35-37.
75. See text accompanying supra note 68.
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118). The first two principles, as we have seen, combine to encourage
interaction between the state and cultural groups from a structural
perspective. The third is intended to provide individuals with an
instrument of cultural and political change.
Shachar has thus proposed a highly interactive design pursuant to
which both cultural groups and the state will be induced better to serve
individual members.76 Yet virtually all of Shachar's analysis in
Multicultural Jurisdictions is inclined toward cultural adaptation. Even
assuming the accuracy of her view that cultural group leaders, facing
selective exit, will reinterpret their traditions, in what sense would
we expect the state to react? Given the paradox of multicultural
vulnerability only arises once the state has demonstrated its willing
ness to accommodate repressive cultural practices, why would we
suddenly expect the state to seek to protect vulnerable members? In
Shachar's terms, how will minority cultural group members be able to
"discipline" the state with the threat of "opting-out" (p. 122), when
the state has already shown itself uninterested in their plight? The
basic notion of empowering individuals through a competitive jurisdic
tional mechanism to engender social change may itself be promising,
but Schachar leaves almost wholly unexamined the public side of this
state-cultural group interface.
Moreover, the principles that compose Shachar's model, and that
serve to construct her transformative-accommodation design, presup
pose state-cultural group negotiation; both the initial allocation of
sub-matter jurisdiction, and the delineation of reversal points, will be
subject to bargaining among state and cultural authorities (pp. 128-30).
Shachar assumes that each authority would seek jurisdiction in
sub-matters most central to its core mission; hence, the group would
likely seek influence over questions pertinent to its survival, while the
state would aim toward acquiring jurisdiction over issues of civic
participation (p. 129). Yet, other than noting that at-risk group
members must not be "den[ied) voice" (p. 129 n.22), that "generosity
at the negotiation stage is required from the state as the stronger
party" (p. 130), and that vaguely stated "incentives" exist for authori
ties to self-regulate and so "engage in constructive dialogue" (p. 130),
Shachar's model does little to institutionalize this critical process.
Surely there will be matters deemed crucial within both state and
cultural spheres (for example, both state and cultural sources of
authority might view jurisdiction over education as indispensable) .77
76. P. 117 ("Transformative accommodation seeks to adapt the power structures of both
nomoi group and state.").
77. In her appendix, Shachar helpfully describes various potential products of a joint
governance scheme in the context of education, see pp. 1 54-60, but she fails, here and else
where, to describe adequately the means by which a dispute among sources of authority over
the initial allocation of submatter jurisdiction in the educational context would be resolved.
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On such contested matters, what process will be invoked to resolve
disputes? Would the state simply prevail, in virtue of its greater power
(perhaps a reasonable, but unexplained result)? Or might something
in the way of a neutral arbiter be appointed? At present, it is difficult
to say. Beyond the few indistinct stipulations noted above, Shachar
merely declares that the process of allocating authority and identifying
choice options be approached "carefully" and with "precision" (pp.
128-29).
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Shachar's treatment here
of individual will is overly facile. Clearly, competition between state
and cultural sources of authority will only be engendered, and so
cultural transformation realized, where group members have options.
But the presence of options is merely a necessary and not a sufficient
precondition for competition.78 For a model premised on competition
to be effective, individuals must not only have clearly delineated
choice options but also the capacity to exercise such options. There are,
though, reasons to expect that capacity to be limited in the multicul
tural context. First, while constitutive attachments are surely more
susceptible to individual will than is sometimes imagined, they none
theless are often quite difficult to abandon.79 Even (perhaps particu
larly) the more vulnerable members of nomoi groups may feel deeply
obligated to conform to religious and other cultural dictates. Second,
individuals socialized within a particular nomos to be compliant individuals socialized into vulnerability, that is - may have a particu
larly difficult time suddenly exercising agency.80 Hence, for the most
vulnerable members of cultural groups to exercise even a partial exit,
much more in the way of state-sponsored resources and intervention
will often be required. While the married woman in the agunah illus
tration might have been in a position to make a genuine choice,81
individuals involved in more extreme cultural contexts almost surely
would not.
78.. Shachar herself appears to recognize this point, see p. 138, and yet she nonetheless
fails to incorporate directly into her model any provision that would guarantee the agency
required for competition to take place.
79. For a view of the self as essentially encumbered by communal attachments, see
SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT, supra note 7, at 13-17. For an opposing view of the
self as rationally revisable, see Rawls, supra note 26, at 543-45.
80. The reference here is to the well-developed literature on unseen dimensions of
power. See JOHN GAVENTA, POWER AND POWERLESSNESS: QUIESCENCE ANO REBELLION
IN AN APPALACHIAN VALLEY (1980); STEVEN LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW (1974).
Shachar notes this literature in a tangential context, p. 136 n.36, but fails to apply its teach
ings to her core assumptions.
81. Indeed, an agunah 's choices today are often not as limited as Shachar indicates.
More progressive leaders in the Orthodox Jewish movement "have to varying degrees ame
liorated a woman's legal disability . .. either in ways ostensibly faithful to the legal system or
in ways that reject the legal system more broadly." Letter from Rabbi Jeremy Kalmanofsky,
Jewish Theological Seminary, to the author (Sept. 10, 2002) (on file with author).
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Imagine, for example, the following paradigm: in a local jurisdic
tion, governed according to a strict interpretation of cultural law, one
woman, call her Amina, has given birth to a child outside of wedlock;
another woman, Mukhtaran, happens to be related to a young boy
seen in the company of a girl from a higher caste. Tribal authorities
sentence Amina, after allowing her an interval of one year to wean her
child, to death by stoning. They order Mukhtaran to submit to a gang
rape.82 How might these women have exercised an option to switch to
a public source of authority? How might these women even have
learned that such an option existed? In addition to submatter alloca
tions and clearly delineated choice options, a model premised on indi
vidual agency in a multicultural context must, at a minimum, provide
for the sort of social, educational, and financial resources at-risk group
members require to recognize, and take advantage of, jurisdictional
options.83
CONCLUSION:

THE ROAD AHEA D

Shachar has chosen Robert Frost's well-known allegory of two
roads diverging in a wood as both prologue and epilogue to her new
work on multiculturalism. "Instead of resorting to so many already
established, tired and misguided approaches toward a just and work
able multiculturalism," she writes, "we must follow the road less
traveled" (p. 150). Though too much of Multicultural Jurisdictions is
itself reiteration of established approaches to multiculturalism,
Shachar, I think, has indeed revealed a new path: the path of a trans
formative multiculturalism, for which we are most fortunate. Yet it is
equally unfortunate that Shachar herself has not moved very far along
that path. Perhaps she now leaves it for others to show the way. Or
perhaps she will return to the subject in some forthcoming work. One
certainly hopes so, for Shachar has shown herself a gifted guide, and
the path she has revealed will not be easy going. Indeed, given the
extent of the problem of individual vulnerability, and the resources
required to solve it, we may have miles to go before we sleep.

82. The scenarios depicted are derived from actual stories. See Norimitsu Onishi,
Mother 's Sentence Unsettles a Nigerian Village, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2002, at A3; Beena Sar
war, Brutality Cloaked as Tradition, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.6, 2002, at AlS.
83. Shachar's treatment of these critical issues is fleeting, at best. See pp. 1 24, 1 38-39.
Her project would be better served had she built these as preconditions directly into her
model and explored pragmatically how they might be achieved.

